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ABSTRACT 
 
Central to the EU’s ‘actorness’ in the world arena is the relationship with the United States. 
This paper explores the ways in which it is possible to conceptualise EU-US relations within a 
changing world arena, and relates them to scholarship on EU-US relations since the end of 
the Cold War, with the aim of exploring the EU’s changing role(s) in transatlantic relations. 
The paper begins by exploring the changing EU-US policy agenda, identifying issues of scope 
and scale in the management of that agenda and relating these to the changing analytical 
agenda for the study of EU-US relations. It then proceeds to identify a number of ways in 
which the EU-US system of relations can be characterised: as a historically shaped set of 
structures and norms, as a combination of markets, hierarchies and networks, as a form of 
incomplete multi-level governance, and as an uneasy blend of bilateralism, multilateralism 
and ‘bi-multilateralism’. These qualities help us to account for the expansion and 
diversification of the ways in which EU-US ‘encounters’ have shaped both the EU-US system 
and the broader global arena since the end of the Cold War. Not least, they help us to think 
about the implications of EU-US relations for ‘European foreign policy’ and the potential roles 
played by the EU, both in relation to US foreign policy and more broadly in the world arena. 
The final part of the paper discusses key elements in the EU’s establishment of roles within 
the changing EU-US system, identifies four key roles for the EU (subaltern, sub-contractor, 
substitute and subversive) and evaluates the ways in which these might develop in the next 
decade. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper is being written in the midst of what many might see as epochal 
events in EU-US relations, and transatlantic relations more generally. The 
impact of President Obama’s visit to Europe has been immense, but it has 
also thrown up important questions about the present and future of EU-US 
relations. Everywhere he has gone, the President has underlined the sea-
change in US foreign policy that has led to conceptions of a new era of 
partnership and cooperation, and has also generated a new focus on the EU 
as a key transatlantic interlocutor for the US. But in many of the places he has 
visited, he has also shown that EU-US relations exist amidst a welter of other 
institutional and political/economic venues and processes. In London, the 
stress was on the G-20 and the ways in which key national governments can 
proceed in a de-stabilised global economy; in Strasbourg, on the key role to 
be played by NATO in the generation of a more orderly and secure world; in 
Prague, on the centrality of the EU to establishing European order and global 
economic institutions; in Ankara, on the need to incorporate Turkey, and by 
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especially (in the case of Turkey) into its enlargement. 
 
This is a major change from the atmosphere and the ‘messages’ of the past 
eight years, although it is clear that the lame-duck period of the George W. 
Bush Administration (accounting for most of his second term) actually saw US 
policies moving quite strongly in these directions. But although it is a major 
change in that sense, it raises key questions about the nature and 
significance of change itself when it comes to EU-US relations (Brzezinski 
2009; de Vasconcelos and Zaborowski 2009; Zaborowski 2008). To put it 
bluntly, the ‘Obama revolution’ in US foreign policy and policy towards Europe 
may be less structural than it is cyclical, and may also not eliminate many of 
the key problems that arise from the changing nature of EU-US relations: the 
atmosphere, that is to say, is just that and not to be downplayed because that 
is what it is. Such changes in atmosphere may make problems easier to 
resolve, but may also make the disjunction between the atmosphere itself and 
the intractability of policy problems more frustrating and disillusioning. They 
may also raise important questions about the logical or appropriate role(s) for 
the EU in a world where at least on the face of it the United States itself is 
projecting a new set of roles to be pursued through its foreign policies. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to set the Obama impact into a broader frame, 
encompassing the period since the end of the Cold War, and to suggest ways 
in which this frame can be filled in to provide a more nuanced picture of what 
is and is not possible in EU-US relations. As in 1989, transatlantic relations in 
general are emerging from a period of severe strain and (at least potentially) 
moving into a new period of creativity and construction. But as in 1989, there 
are forces in the broader world arena, and in the EU and the US themselves, 
that create both opportunities and challenges, both for policy-makers and for 
analysts. I argue here that in order to understand what has gone on and what 
is going on in EU-US relations, we need to develop a view of the forces that 
encourage and the forces that constrain key areas of policy development, and 
to be acutely aware of the ways in which agendas, policy contexts, policy 
encounters and policy-making intersect to create a multi-dimensional ‘Euro-
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system’ is a major if not dominant component. In addition, we need to 
maintain a clear view of the ways in which the ‘terms of engagement’ within 
EU-US relations have changed over the past twenty years and the ways in 
which these reflect the changing roles both of the EU and of the US in the 
world arena. Although the relationship is mature and generally stable that 
does not mean that there are no issues of status and role to be addressed, on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
The paper begins by exploring the changing EU-US policy agenda, identifying 
issues of scope and scale in the management of that agenda and relating 
these to the changing analytical agenda for the study of EU-US relations. It 
then proceeds to identify a number of ways in which the EU-US system of 
relations can be characterised: as a historically shaped set of structures and 
norms, as a combination of markets, hierarchies and networks, as a form of 
incomplete multi-level governance, and as an uneasy blend of bilateralism, 
multilateralism and ‘bi-multilateralism’. These qualities help us to account for 
the expansion and diversification of the ways in which EU-US ‘encounters’ 
have shaped both the EU-US system and the broader global arena since the 
end of the Cold War. Not least, they help us to think about the implications of 
EU-US relations for ‘European foreign policy’ and the potential roles played by 
the EU in relation to US foreign policy. The final part of the paper discusses 
key elements in the EU’s establishment of roles within the changing EU-US 
system, identifies four key roles for the EU (subaltern, sub-contractor, 
substitute and subversive) and evaluates the ways in which these might 
develop in the next decade. 
 
Agendas 
The current policy agenda for EU-US relations can be seen to encompass a 
wide set of issues and associated processes, and this creates problems of 
management and problem-solving. To put it simply, the current EU-US policy 
agenda has grown both in scale and in scope, and one question that thus 
arises is whether the institutional and other frameworks for its management 
are appropriate or adequate for that purpose. Compared with the late 1980s, 
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have come to fruition, and some that were hardly contemplated have been 
thrust onto the agenda. 
 
A review of the key issue areas on the EU-US agenda gives a broad 
impression of these problems and questions (and clearly also creates further 
questions about what is and is not mentioned here!). The key issues seem to 
be: 
 
¾  Transatlantic Economic Partnership (and economic frictions). This is of 
course a very long-standing issue, one that can be traced back to the 
very beginnings of relations between European integration and the 
United States. In the late 1980s, the impact of the Single Market 
Programme, allied with perceived stagnation in the US economy and 
with structural changes in the world economy, created an atmosphere 
of tension and at times recriminations across the Atlantic. This 
atmosphere – and indeed, some of the underlying problems – have far 
from disappeared, and it might be argued that the global financial crisis 
with its attendant implications for trade, regulation and development 
has its roots in some of the trends that date back to the 1980s. One 
key difference in the current situation is that a much more 
comprehensive institutional framework has grown up around 
‘transatlantic economic governance’ (Pollack and Shaffer 2001, Pollack 
2005, Steffenson 2006), most recently through the formalisation of the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the Transatlantic Economic 
Council. The adequacy of these institutions remains to be 
demonstrated, and the extent to which they can contribute to intensified 
cooperation and indeed integration at the transatlantic level in a 
turbulent period is open to question (Peterson and Steffenson, 2009; 
Smith M. 2009a). A wide range of disputes still surrounds the 
transatlantic economy, and the scope and scale of these disputes has 
increased as transatlantic integration has deepened; the question is 
whether the institutional framework is up to the task of managing the 
  5more fundamental as opposed to the everyday disputes that have 
emerged. 
 
¾  World Trade Negotiations and Inter-Regional Arrangements: One of 
the key axes of the EU-US relationship, today as in 1989, is the 
multilateral trading system. In the late 1980s, there were real questions 
as to whether this system could be reformed so as to provide a robust 
institutional and rule-based framework for a globalising commercial 
system. The EC (as it then was) and the US were universally 
acknowledged as the central actors in this system, and the fate of the 
Uruguay Round was in their hands (Paeman and Bensch 1995??). 
Twenty years on, and there are real questions as to whether the 
multilateral trading system can provide a robust framework for the 
management of a further globalised but tension-ridden world. Both the 
EU and the US have shown their willingness to consider other, more 
limited solutions to their commercial challenges, including inter-regional 
and bilateral free trade agreements that often express a more 
demanding approach to rules on such areas as investment than can 
the multilateral system itself (McGuire and Smith 2008: Chapter 7). So 
there is the issue of defection – of the undermining of the multilateral 
system by the creation of new and more limited frameworks in which 
power can be exercise more effectively by the dominant commercial 
actors. But there is also the issue of diffusion – the fact that power in 
the global commercial system is no longer concentrated so heavily in 
the EU and the US, and that in effect there is a multipolar world 
commercial order in which the principles of multilateralism may be less 
easy to sustain and global governance less easy to consolidate (). As 
with transatlantic economic partnership, the issues of scale and scope 
present themselves to the EU and the US, this time in a way that 
encourages them to think of alternatives to the multilateral system 
around which the development of their relationship has been centred. 
 
¾  The Euro, the Dollar and the Macro-Economy: A key and growing part 
of the EU-US agenda is monetary policy and the management of the 
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commercial interaction, this is an issue with a long history. In the late 
1980s, the proclamation of ‘one market, one money’ and the 
publication of the Delors Report carried on a tradition of European 
efforts to develop monetary cooperation if not integration, which can be 
traced back to the Werner Report in the early 1970s. The challenge of 
an unstable Dollar and of increasing global instability created by the 
interaction of the Dollar, the Yen and the major European currencies 
was a key preoccupation of those engaged in international finance (). 
Fast forward to 2009, and the instability not only of the Dollar but also 
of the entire US financial system interacts with the rise of the Renminbi 
and the Euro to create fundamental financial uncertainty at the global 
level, with profound local and regional impacts. The Euro has 
established itself as a ‘real’ international currency, with increasing 
global influence but without what the French would describe as an 
‘economic government’ with which it can relate. The Dollar has 
continued its long-term pattern of fluctuations, and the deficits 
generated by the US economy both internally and externally are a 
central preoccupation of monetary policy-makers. But the world is not 
bipolar in monetary terms, and it is not obvious that an EU-US axis 
contains the solution to the current instability. Rather, as the increasing 
prominence of the G-20 shows, the shifting balance of power in the 
global economy demands different institutional and political-economic 
fixes, and also creates divisions within the EU itself.  
 
¾  Energy, Environment and Development: Relations between European 
integration and the US over the past eight years have shown a central 
pattern of tensions over key issues of energy (and energy security), 
environment (especially climate change) and development (including 
issues of human security and human rights). These issues have 
different but intersecting trajectories in EU-US relations, with energy 
having been a central political issue from the late 1960s onwards, 
environment especially salient from the late 1980s and development 
being a focus of competition from the 1970s, but increasingly politicised 
  7and securitised from the late 1980s onwards. The development of new 
institutional capacity within the EU, and the shifting nature of US grand 
strategy as applied to these three areas, have been central features of 
the EU-US relationship for the past twenty years. But these issues 
have important characteristics that make them distinctive in EU-US 
relations. First, they are areas in which the development of EU 
interests and capacities has been a reflection of and has gone 
alongside the development of the issues themselves, although 
admittedly in an uneven way. Second, they are issue in which US 
engagement has often been uncertain and constrained, either by 
domestic political and economic forces or by ideological tendencies 
within the US government machine. Third, they are also areas in which 
key levers and instruments are outside the control of the EU and the 
US, acting together or separately. As a result, the EU has been able to 
establish and develop a strategic presence in these areas, especially in 
development and environment, often partly because of the absence of 
the Americans, and to provide international leadership. But there are 
major areas of unevenness here, which imply that nothing should be 
taken for granted about the EU’s continuing assertiveness or their 
capacity to exercise international leadership; the international context 
and the balance of forces is changing, new forces are entering the 
arena, and both the EU and the US will have to adapt, for example to 
the growing role of China in Africa and its implications for development 
policy-making. 
 
¾  European Security and European Order: European integration was 
crucially based on considerations of European security, and during the 
Cold War came to play a major if arguably subordinate role in the 
stabilisation of the continent. This was one of the central reasons for 
the US’ constant support for the principle of integration, if not for the 
details of its impact in key areas of economic policy. By the late 1980s, 
the effects of détente (and then confrontation) between the US and the 
USSR, and the effects of domestic change within the Soviet Union and 
member states of the Soviet bloc, had created a situation in which the 
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securitised aspects of their mutual relations. 
 
¾  World Order: The ‘Long War’, Institutions and Crisis Management: The 
past eight years (but it must not be forgotten, much of the previous 
decade as well) have seen EU-US relations focused inexorably on the 
‘long war’ against rogue regimes and the groups that attach to them, 
most obviously terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda. But it must 
not be imagined that European-American issues generated by long-
term conflicts and differences of view on world order are new to the 
post-Cold War period. The history of EC and EU-US relations over the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ample demonstration that such tensions 
can be traced back for thirty or forty years, and of course European-
American tensions over the past and future of colonialism were a 
formative influence on the post-Cold War world itself. By the late 
1980s, there was a well-established track record of EC-US differences 
about the recognition of the PLO and the rights of the Palestinians 
more generally, and about the ways in which the US felt it should 
support ‘liberation movements’ and repressive regimes in developing 
countries (). There was also a history of ‘European’ initiatives with the 
aim of at least modifying and perhaps transforming the Israel-Palestine 
issue, of which the outcomes had been inconclusive to say the least. 
By 2009 there was a lot more on the charge-sheet: accumulated 
evidence that the EU collectively and EU Member States individually 
could muster very little leverage on the key international conflicts, and 
that in many ways the US was the indispensable power. Afghanistan, 
Iraq and (in a more qualified way) Iran all seemed to bear out this stark 
contrast, and to point to the limitations of ‘European foreign policy’ both 
institutionally and politically (Youngs 2006). To be sure, US limitations 
were also evident in a number of cases (e.g. Darfur), but this did not 
really modify the picture. 
 
The upshot of this examination of key ‘agenda items’ seems to be that we are 
looking at a spectrum of EU-US involvements, and at a number of patterns of 
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collective action, material resources and normative leverage and can act on 
level terms (or even at an advantage) in relation to the US. At the other, 
despite EU attempts to construct narratives presenting themselves as part of 
a radical re-configuration of world politics, and despite changes in the nature 
of key problems including that of security, we are confronted with an EU that 
lacks material resources, finds it difficult to achieve collective action, and has 
little in the way of normative leverage on the participant (including the US) in 
key areas of conflict. Analytically, at one end of the spectrum the liberals – 
whether interdependence theorists or social constructivists, or both – can find 
much to justify their focus on the EU as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power; at the 
other end, the realists (most of whom in this context are Americans talking 
about US foreign policy, not about the EU) can find irrefutable evidence to 
support their view that the EU cannot and will not influence the fundamentals 
of world politics or international ‘grand strategy’. 
 
It is clear even from this brief discussion that the EU-US policy agenda 
creates more questions than answers about the overall trajectory of EU-US 
relations. One thing that is clearly needed is some clear thinking about the 
variations in EU-US relations and the ways in which they can be 
conceptualised. What is it that creates the textures and the varieties of EU-US 
relations, and what ideas can be used to understand them? The next  section 
of the paper suggests ways of approaching this set of issues, and links them 
to the development of EU-US relations during the past two decades. 
 
Characterising the EU-US System 
The first observation is that contexts matter in the study of EU-US relations, 
and that an understanding of contexts can afford insights into what is and is 
not possible for institutions and policy-makers. A second observation is that  
contexts are likely to affect both what is possible in the way of EU-US 
processes, specifically competition and convergence, and what might be 
characterised as the outputs of the EU-US system, in terms of patterns of 
competition and convergence and of impacts on the broader global arena. A 
third observation, building on what has already been said in the paper, is that 
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to which that agenda is related, will be crucial to establishing what roles the 
EU might play in EU-US relations and beyond. The arguments seem to me to 
fall into five interrelated areas: 
 
¾  First, the historical context. One would expect this to be central to a 
study of the past twenty years, and it is crucial in at least three ways. 
First, there is the impact of learning, and the ways in which this is 
inscribed into the narratives of EU-US relations. What was said in the 
preceding section about the agenda suggests that both EU and US 
policy-makers have learned multiple lessons from the history of their 
mutual relations, and that these vary enormously between the different 
parts of the issue spectrum. They may vary, but they are always there, 
in the memories and the expectations of those involved in transatlantic 
relations, shaping their perceptions and actions (Smith 2009b). 
Second, there is the importance of historical power shifts in the broader 
world arena. We have seen at least two in the past twenty years: first, 
the end of the Cold War, and second, the emergence of the new 
‘powers’ in the BRICs and other emergent countries. It does not take 
much imagination to see that the process of learning within the EU-US 
relationship, and the shifts of power in the wider arena are 
interconnected and can play into and off each other. Third, there is the 
(again related) issue of legitimacy, broadly encapsulated by the 
problems of ‘leadership and followership’. There has been constant 
pressure on the capacity and inclination of the US to lead, and of the 
EU and its Member States to follow, not only in transatlantic relations 
but also in broader issues of global political economy, diplomacy or 
security. Each of these three historical factors – social learning, global 
power shifts and leadership/followership – plays into issues such as the 
generation and management of EU-US crises and the handling of EU 
enlargement. 
 
¾  Second, the coexistence of markets, hierarchies and networks in the 
EU-US relationship (McGuire and Smith 2008: Chapter 2). The 
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grown and intensified. Markets have become more integrated and 
efficient, capable of spreading ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ with equal speed and 
impact. Hierarchies have been strengthened in a number of areas, 
most especially those that border on ‘hard security’. Networks have 
become more pervasive and fluid, and have demanded new regulatory 
structures where they have challenged governmental power. This 
raises in a very direct form the question of complementarity: to what 
extent are these developments mutually compatible, and to what extent 
do they create new contradictions within EU-US relations? As has been 
pointed out by a number of studies (for example Pollack and Shaffer 
2001, Steffenson 2005), the transatlantic economic and political space 
sees intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational relations 
at historically high levels of intensity, but there is no guarantee that 
these three types of relations will act in mutual reinforcement; indeed, 
the evidence is that they can act in mutual contradiction in areas as 
diverse as trade, environment and counter-terrorism. In this context, 
the EU is clearly a key structure, but the question whether it is a key 
actor or ‘power’ remains largely unresolved and contingent. 
 
¾  Third, the impact of multilevel governance and embedded 
institutions/norms. One of the key contexts for the development of EU-
US relations is the growing array of governance structures within the 
North Atlantic area. At a purely nominal level, the number and range of 
these institutions has developed rapidly over the past two decades: in 
1989, there was no Transatlantic Declaration, no New Transatlantic 
Agenda, no High level Group, no sectoral dialogues, no Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership or Transatlantic Economic Council. Clearly, the 
development has been uneven, with growth concentrated in the 
economic/social end of the spectrum where there are fewer 
competitors to EU-US relations, and less obvious in the ‘hard security’ 
end of the spectrum where there are other influential games in town 
(Pollack 2003, 2005; Pollack and Shaffer 2001; Steffenson 2005). But 
even at the ‘hard security’ end, there is increased linkage between the 
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different bases. Indeed, EU-US relations are an essential part of 
transatlantic governance, and in turn transatlantic governance looms 
large in policy-making both in the USA and at the European level. The 
extent to which this has generated new norms and a consensus on 
how to address key problems of world order is of course a focus of 
intense debate: as in the late 1980s, the atmosphere of the early 2000s 
has been fraught on both counts, attesting to the intervention of 
domestic forces on both sides and the impact of broader global 
changes. This alerts us to the fact that ‘domestic’ forces, often linked 
with transnational and transgovernmental forces, are crucial to the type 
of multilevel governance that has emerged in and around the EU-US 
relationship. John Peterson argued in the early1990s that this was a 
key aspect of the ‘new transatlanticism’ that he saw emerging (1996), 
and there is every indication that the forces to which he drew attention 
have both persisted and – in a period of recession – become more 
significant in shaping role conceptions and role performance both in the 
EU and in the US. 
 
¾  Fourth, complexity of process. One key implication of what has been 
said about context so far is that EU-US relations demonstrate 
complexity of process. Two manifestations of this complexity are, first, 
the coexistence of competition and convergence, and second, the 
intersection of bilateral, multilateral and ‘bi-multilateral’ relations in a 
wide range of areas of EU-US negotiation and coordination. The first of 
these features, coexisting competition and convergence and the 
consequent impact of ‘competitive cooperation’ in EU-US relations, 
raises important questions about the extent to which the EU and the 
US can engage credibly in a ‘strategic partnership’ aimed at influencing 
broader processes in the world arena (Smith 1998). This has been an 
issue for most if not all of the 1989-2009 period, in areas covering the 
full spectrum of EU-US relations. The problem is not simply a one-
sided one, concerning the credibility and legitimacy of the EU as a 
partner for the US; the credibility and legitimacy of the US as a partner 
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the management of American power as well as the achievement of EU 
collective action. The second of the features at issue here, the 
coexistence of different types of relationships in EU-US relations, is 
crucial not only at the micro-level of transatlantic problem-solving, but 
also at the macro-level in relation to the maintenance and development 
of the multilateral system at the global level. Many of the issues that 
concern the EU and the US as partners or competitors in transatlantic 
relations generate complex externalities that then affect the processes 
of institutionalisation and rule-making at the global level (Smith 2005). 
Historically, this has been most evident in questions of world trade, but 
over the past twenty years this phenomenon has diffused into many 
areas of the global political economy, the diplomatic process and the 
security sphere, so that in 2009 we can discuss in quite concrete terms 
the ways in which EU-US security and defence interactions might 
impact on global institutions and rules. 
 
¾  Fifth, variety of outputs: From what has been said in this section it can 
be seen that the ‘EU-US system’ produces a wide variety of outputs, 
some of which feed back into the further development of the system 
itself and some of which create externalities with impacts on other 
actors or on the global arena in general. A rapid summary of the 
outputs produced might cover the following: bilateral institutionalisation 
via the NTA, the TEP and associated dialogues; inter-regional 
competition as both the EU and the US attempt to ‘export’ solutions to 
trade and other issues and come into competition in third regions; 
multilateral rule-making, both as the result of EU-US cooperation and 
as a consequence of competition within international organisations or 
regimes; and private management of the global political economy, as 
the result of the intense transnationalism of the EU-US system and its 
effects on the broader global arena. Although these outputs and their 
effects have been felt over the long term in matters of international 
political economy, increasingly they have made themselves felt in the 
diplomacy of human rights, the environment and ‘soft security’. In areas 
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differences between EU and US perspectives on conflict and its 
management, but it is possible even in these areas to discern the 
components of competition and convergence: on the one side, the 
proposal of a ‘European pillar’ in NATO can be seen both as a symbol 
of competing approaches and as a manifestation of strategic 
convergence within a US-led security system, whilst on the other side, 
the increasing militarisation of aspects of ‘European foreign policy’ 
goes along with a relative withdrawal by the US from some of its more 
ambitious overseas military commitments. When we compare the 
situation in 2009 with that which was apparent in 1989, it is clear that 
there has been expansion and diversification of the ways in which the 
EU-US system operates, but that some underlying issues relating to 
the tensions between ‘European’ and American actions remain 
apparent. 
 
From the initial observation that ‘contexts, processes and outputs matter’, this 
section has attempted to develop a more nuanced view of how they have 
mattered and do matter in EU-US relations, and linked them in a rudimentary 
fashion to the ways in which the EU-US system affects both the participants in 
it and the broader global arena. One of the key features that have emerged 
from this discussion is complexity and variety. In other words, alongside the 
complexity and variety of the EU-US policy agenda we have to set complexity 
and variety of contexts shaping the system, processes driving it and outputs 
linking it to both broader and narrower arenas of world economic and political 
life.  In the final section of the paper, the discussion turns to some of the 
implications of these features for the participants – specifically, the role of the 
EU both within the system and in the broader global arena. 
 
Roles 
Thus far, this paper has explored two key aspects of EU-US relations since 
the late 1980s: the agendas around which they centre, and the contexts, 
processes and outputs characteristic of the ‘EU-US system’. The major 
characteristics both of agendas and of contexts, processes and outputs 
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levels, and it poses important questions of management for the participants 
within it. In this section of the paper, I focus on one aspect of the EU’s 
participation in the ‘EU-US system’: the ways in which the EU’s role has been 
conceived, developed and sustained since the late 1980s. The discussion 
initially focuses on general questions of role definition and performance, and 
then on the developing roles of the EU in the ‘EU-US system’. 
 
As Ole Elgström and I have noted in another context, there has been 
considerable interest, on the part of both analysts and policy-makers, in the 
notion of a distinct EU role (or roles) in the global arena (Elgström and Smith 
2006: Introduction). The ideas that the EU is a ‘civilian’ power (or even a 
‘civilising’ power) (Maull 2005, Linklater 2005), that it is a ‘normative power’ 
(Manners 2002, 2007) or that it is an ‘ethical power’ (Aggestam 2008?) are 
one expression of this interest, encapsulating a kind of ‘EUropean 
exceptionalism’ that might in some respects match ideas of American 
‘exceptionalism’ (Smith 2009c). Each of these conceptions embodies an 
assumption that the EU can and should construct a distinctive role in the 
world arena, and that one key element in that role is likely to be the positions 
of the United States. But none of these ideas explores in any real detail how 
this might play into the ‘EU-US system’ – how might EU roles within the 
system be conceived, how might they be performed, and how might they be 
evaluated, not only in terms of the system itself but also in terms of the EU’s 
roles within the broader world arena? 
 
Discussion of the broad notion of roles clearly brings us back to a point made 
earlier in the paper, about the ways in which the ‘EU-US system’ might be 
seen by liberals and by realists (to use a crude shorthand). A liberal approach 
to roles is likely to emphasise the ways in which they respond to social forces 
and to the interplay of institutions and ideas, producing a dynamic set of role 
conceptions and ‘self-understandings’ on the part of participants in the 
system. A realist approach is more likely to focus on power and power 
structures, and the ways in which traditional conceptions of role (‘great 
power’, ‘secondary power’, etc) emerge as rational adjustments to the power 
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practical problem: it is not a state – indeed, it is composed of states that in 
many cases have strong national role conceptions that have not been 
obliterated by their entanglement in European integration – but it does exist in 
a world arena in which state power is still a central element, alongside the 
growing influence of international institutions and rules. 
 
In order to deal with this situation, one way forward is to focus on the 
generation, performance and evaluation of roles without any preconception 
that only states can have effective international roles and status. This is 
particularly relevant in the ‘EU-US system’, since as argued earlier this is 
essentially a mixed system in which markets, hierarchies and networks play a 
central part, and in which the policy agenda is characterised by linkage and 
‘mixity’. The system is also characterised by unevenness, with major 
variations in the conditions displayed by different issue areas and with 
important differences of trajectory and maturity across issue areas and across 
time. 
 
Given these conditions, it is to be expected that the EU’s participation in the 
‘EU-US system’ will display variety and unevenness, that it will vary across 
time and across issue areas, and that it will generate multiple roles performed 
both within the system and outside it, in the broader world arena. On this 
basis, I would propose four different roles for the EU, not as a definitive 
characterisation of its position within the ‘EU-US system’ but as a starting 
point for discussion: the roles are those of subaltern, sub-contractor, 
substitute and subversive. Each of them, it seems to me, embodies a 
response to the demands of the ‘EU-US system’ and to US policies, both at 
the material level of interests and resources and at the ideational level of 
norms, learning and (self)understanding. 
 
¾  The role of subaltern essentially casts the EU into a dependent position 
within the ‘EU-US system’, seeing it as the channel for and the 
executor of policies either formed within the USA or developed within 
the ‘Atlantic community’ more broadly. Here, the EU is seen (and sees 
  18itself, or is seen by Member States) as a means for the transmission of 
US preferences and the achievement of US aims, particularly in the 
area of security but also in broader areas of economic and social 
organisation. Areas in which this role might be played include: the 
framing of EU enlargement policies, both in the aftermath of the Cold 
War and currently; the transmission of US economic ideas (neo-
liberalism); the transmission of US popular culture over a very long 
period 
 
¾  The role of sub-contractor implies a conception in which the EU sees 
itself (and is seen by the US) as a junior partner (or an alternative to 
US unilateral actions) in the performance of important international 
tasks. It is different from that of subaltern, since it is based on 
recognition that the EU can negotiate and can establish itself as a valid 
interlocutor with the US, and that ‘contracts’ can also be renegotiated, 
repudiated or terminated. Areas in which this role might be discerned 
include: regional conflict prevention; post-conflict reconstruction; parts 
of development policy; potentially, elements of energy security policy. 
 
¾  The role of substitute is one that has been actively canvassed by EU 
leaders, and especially the Commission at various times in the past 
twenty years. It rests on the understanding that the US can either fail to 
provide ‘governmental services’ (Mandelbaum 2005) or provide them in 
ways or with conditions that are unacceptable to the intended 
recipients, and that the EU provides a ‘civilised’ or ‘effective’ 
alternative. The past twenty years provide numerous examples in 
which this role has been promoted: inter-regional relations, 
environment, human rights and others. Within the ‘EU-US system’ this 
role conception can of course create disruption and recriminations: the 
role is thus one that is partly generated by the system in the absence 
or in a deficiency of US leadership, and partly the result of activities 
within the wider world arena that feed back into the ‘EU-US system’. 
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and promoted by EU institutions and officials. It relies upon the 
assumption that the US view of world order and of the use of power is 
out of kilter with the realities of international life in the twenty-first 
century (but actually the idea has been around for at least the twenty 
years referred to in this paper). As a result, the EU is seen as an active 
agent in the reconfiguration of international power – not only the 
distribution of power, but also the nature of power itself. In some ways, 
this role conception overlaps with that of ‘substitute’, but it embodies 
something more than merely filling the gaps in US leadership or 
activism. It proposes an alternative approach to power and its exercise, 
and a different basis for world politics centred on a cosmopolitan view 
and encompassing the active engagement of global civil society as well 
as multilateral institutions. Areas in which this role conception can be 
discerned include: approaches to the Islamic world; views of world 
order and the nature of security; development policies; approaches to 
resource management and environmental policy. 
 
Pretty obviously, these brief outlines of role conceptions raise important 
questions. How do the conceptions relate to role performance? Does the EU’s 
evaluation of its effectiveness in performing these roles align with that of 
policy-makers in the US, or even in EU Member States? Above all, each of 
these conceptions (and others that might be suggested) rest on assumptions 
about the roles of the US itself, and on the assumption that these roles are 
fairly consistent across time. But actually, the role of the US in the ‘EU-US 
system’ and in the world arena is subject to at least some variation. The US’ 
national role conception may be that of an ‘exceptional’ country with a mission 
to spread American values and the benefits of US power as broadly as 
possible, but the Clinton and Bush – and now the Obama – administrations 
have pursued this conception with varying determination, diverse methods 
and uneven success. Within the ‘EU-US system’ itself, resting as it does on 
what might be termed a political and economic ‘security community’, the terms 
on which EU and US role conceptions are played out may differ markedly 
  20from those encountered within the broader world arena (although as we have 
noted, there are links and feedback mechanisms between these two arenas). 
 
Conclusion 
As is to be expected, the conclusion to this paper at one level is a set of more 
or less well defined questions. Simply put, they are: 
 
¾  How does the characterisation in this paper of the evolution of the EU-
US policy agenda help us to understand the potential for the 
development of new roles by the EU, and the limitations on those 
roles? 
 
¾  How does the analysis in this paper of the contexts, processes and 
outputs of the ‘EU-US system’ help us to define the ways in which the 
EU might play certain roles in the system, and how these roles might 
vary across time and across issue areas? 
 
¾  How does the characterisation of four potential roles for the EU enable 
us to form viable research questions about the nature of the ‘EU-US 
system’ and the linkages between that system and the broader world 
arena? 
 
One thing does seem clear, though. It does not appear that the EU has 
established a stable role or set of roles in EU-US relations during the period 
since the end of the Cold War. Rather, there is a set of overlapping and often 
unstable roles that can come into tension with each other, and which can 
affect the EU’s capacity to operate not only within EU-US relations narrowly 
defined but also in other areas of the global arena. At the beginning of the 
paper, I outlined the types of changes and the types of question that seem to 
be suggested by the early days of the Obama Administration. Whatever the 
future trajectory of the lines established in the past two months, they do seem 
to raise important questions about the ‘space’ available to the EU for the 
development of distinctive and stable roles both within the ‘EU-US system and 
  21in the wider world. To that extent, the questions raised in very imperfect form 
in this paper are validated. 
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